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The Globalization of United States Debt:
The Real Impact of China's Rise as a Creditor
State
MICHAEL R. MYERS*
ABSTRACT

In this Note, I seek to answer a simple question: By owning a large
quantity of United States debt, can a foreign country influence United
States policies at home or abroad? To answer, I apply scholarship in
financial leverage theory to China-the largest foreign holder of U.S.
debt. As a result, I find no plausible threat of China using financial
leverage against the United States.
Instead, I argue that the true impact of China's rise as a creditor
state has been its ability to fundamentally undervalue its currency by
investing in the sovereign debt of foreign nations. Such monetary policies
run contrary to China's obligations with the International Monetary
Fund and expose the need for a more effective internationalenforcement
mechanism for intentional currency devaluations. While the World Trade
Organization's Dispute Settlement Board may provide an alternative
solution, I believe China's emergence as a tradingpower will insulate it
from internationalpunishment.
In the end, I look to the market, or "global invisible hand" for solace.
I argue that over the long term the global market will act as a regulator
and will rein in China's currency policies as the country liberalizes its
markets and begins to shift away from a traditional export-driven
economy.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, China has emerged as a creditor nation,
building up foreign currency reserves and investing in the sovereign
debt of foreign nations. At the moment, China owns over a trillion
dollars of United States debt, leaving many Americans afraid that the
Chinese have the power to influence the United States' stance on
domestic and foreign issues.
However, I argue the real impact of China's emergence as a creditor
nation is that the country's reclamation of its monetary sovereignty has
allowed it to manipulate global currency markets to fundamentally
undervalue Chinese currency. While these manipulative policies are
contrary to China's obligations with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the lack of an effective international enforcement mechanism has
allowed the country to grow its economy into one of the most powerful
trading nations in the world. As a result, even if an effective
enforcement solution is found, it is too late to have a significant impact
on China's monetary policy. Rather, I argue the global market-or the
"Global Invisible Hand"-will act as a regulator as China's economic
focus begins to shift away from its traditional export-driven economy.
In this Note, I proceed by first explaining why China is central to
any study concerning the globalization of U.S. debt. Second, I debunk
the "Great Myth," or the idea that China can use its position as a
creditor nation to influence U.S. policy. Third, I analyze what I believe
to be the real impact of China's rise to creditor status: its ability to
fundamentally undervalue its currency. Fourth, I provide a brief
historical background of how the IMF was created to stop currency
devaluations, but also highlight current flaws in the IMF regulatory
system. Fifth, I briefly summarize the World Trade Organization's
(WTO) dispute resolution process as an alternative enforcement
approach. Lastly, I explain why the "Global Invisible Hand" will correct
China's currency policy as the country shifts its economic focus.
I. WHY Focus ON CHINA?
It is important to analyze China's rise as a creditor nation, because
as an authoritarian regime its emergence as a global leader poses
interesting challenges for the United States. The two countries disagree
on a myriad of global issues including nonproliferation, security in the
Pacific Rim, humanitarian intervention, and global governance
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structures.' As China wields more global influence, it is important to
know whether the country can influence U.S. policy on global issues.
Moreover, China is central to any study concerning the foreign-held
U.S. debt, because China owns more U.S. debt than any other foreign
nation. Currently, the country owns 1.185 trillion dollars of U.S. dollardenominated debt, about one-third of the total of all other nations
combined. 2 Since 2005, China has built up an unprecedented amount of
foreign currency reserves in order to keep the value of its currency, the
3
Yuan Renminbi (RMB), artificially low relative to major currencies. By
intentionally keeping the value of the RMB low, China makes its goods
relatively less expensive than goods produced in other export-driven
economies, enticing U.S. companies and consumers to buy goods from
the Chinese marketplace. 4 Unquestionably, the undervaluation of the
RMB is directly attributable to international competition.5
But before one can analyze risks associated with China's ownership
of such a large quantity of U.S. debt, it is important to understand the
mechanics of how the country uses foreign reserves to implement its
currency policies. In the most simplified terms, to devalue the RMB, the
People's Bank of China buys U.S. dollars (USD) in the open market,
while simultaneously printing its own currency.6 As a result, China
accumulates huge foreign reserves of U.S. cash,7 which it must safely
invest while at least earning the risk-free rate.8 To do this, the People's
Bank of China invests in U.S. Treasury bills, notes, and bonds,
considered by most investors to be the safest investments on earth
because the U.S. government backs them. 9 U.S Treasury securities are
1. Daniel W. Drezner, Bad Debts: Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great
Power Politics, 34 IN'L SECURITY 7, 21 (2009).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MAJOR FOREIGN HOLDERS OF TREASURY SECURITIES,
(Nov. 15, 2017), http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfhhis01.txt. At the time of this
article, the most recent figures are from August 2016 where the total amount of U.S. debt
held by foreign countries was 3.949 trillion dollars.
3. Alexandra Esmel, Currency Wars: The Need for InternationalSolutions, 43 DENV.
J. IN'L L. & POLY 403, 407 (2015).
4. Id. at 408.
5. Id. ('The link between [China's] monetary policy to artificially keep the RMB
undervalued allow[s] them to lower [a firm's] cost of production in key industries relative
j] to [] world prices and [to] flood foreign markets [with] their exports.").
6. See Anthony Yu, Comment, China's Currency Practices and "Currency
Manipulation": The Power of Action in Inaction, 26 GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 577, 581
(2013) (examining how Chinese intervene in foreign exchange markets by releasing and
buying foreign reserves, while the Euro, Japanese Yen, and British Pound "float" with
market forces to determine their value).
7. Foreign reserves of U.S. dollars are essentially piles of U.S. cash.
8. The risk-free rate is the rate of return that allows an investment to keep pace with
inflation.
9. See THOMAS OATLEY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 336 (5th ed. 2013).
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debt securities. Thus, China is effectively lending money to the U.S.
government in exchange for a return on its investment. Put simply,
China buying 1.13 trillion dollars of U.S. Treasury securities is the
equivalent of extending the U.S. government a 1.13 trillion dollar loan.
II. THE GREAT MYTH OF FOREIGN-HELD DEBT
As an authoritarian regime, China's possession of so much U.S. debt
inevitably begs the question: Can China affect domestic policy here in
the United States? This is what I call the "Great Myth" of foreign-held
debt-that China has the ability to use its financial leverage to
influence U.S. politics. Politicians often use coercion rhetoric to boost
agendas for budget cuts and "belt-tightening."10 This rhetoric often
comes from the political right, but even President Obama in 2007
warned of the dangers of China financing large portions of America's
debt, stating, "It's pretty hard to have a tough negotiation with the
Chinese when they are our bankers.""
Yet, China's rise as a creditor nation does not give it leverage to
influence U.S. policy. 12 It is true that China lends money to the United
States through the open market and that the United States and China
have entered into a debtor-creditor relationship. Most Americans
compare this relationship to the typical debtor-creditor relationship
where a debtor's need for cash leaves the debtor vulnerable to the
creditor's demands. But it is important to remind ourselves that we are
not talking about banks and individuals. We are talking about the two
most powerful countries in the history of the world, influenced by
markets and law.
The United States and People's Republic of China are home to the
two largest economies in the world by Gross Domestic Product (GDP).13
After China passed Japan as the largest foreign holder of U.S. debt in
2008,14 intense discussion emerged among scholars and economists
concerning China's ability to influence U.S. politics. These discussions
centered on what was termed "Financial Leverage Theory:" the ability of
a creditor state to use its economic position to influence the policies of a
10. MARK BLYTH, AUSTERITY: THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA 5, 8 (2013) (arguing

that in the wake of the recent economic recession, politicians continue to sound the horn of
a "sovereign debt crisis" to reduce the United States debt; but according to Blyth, the crisis
was not about debt, it was about flaws in the banking system.).
11. Drezner, supra note 1, at 15.
12. Id. at 18.
13. GDP Ranking, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDPranking-table (last updated July 1, 2017) (click one of the file types in the right column to

download rankings).
14. Drezner, supra note 1, at 8.

THE GLOBALIZATION OF UNITED STATES DEBT

499

debtor state. 15 Scholarship in this area widely indicates that China is
not in a position to use its status as a creditor nation to influence U.S.
16
policy.
Four factors must exist for financial leverage to cause a target state
to concede ground on domestic and global issues.17 The target state
must "be unable to find alternative sources of credit; lack the capability
to inflict costs on the coercing state in retaliation to any financial
pressures; anticipate few conflicts with the coercing state over time; and
try to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime."18 None of these factors
hold true in China-U.S. relations. 19 Further analysis reveals how the
global market and the interdependency of the two countries prevent
each nation from using financial statecraft to influence each other's
policy agendas.
First, the United States-more than any other country-has the
ability to obtain financing from sovereign nations and private sector
investors. Ever since the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the U.S.
dollar has been the world's main reserve currency. 20 As a result, it is
often in the best interest of countries and multinational corporations to
buy U.S. dollar denominated assets in order to facilitate international
trade. 21 Also, the dollar is also considered a "safe-haven" in times of
global economic turmoil. 22 During periods of uncertainty, central banks
and private investors around the world park their money in U.S.
Treasury securities. Thus, the United States can quickly accumulate
needed funds in an economic downturn, while paying relatively low
interest on its debt. 23
Second, as the largest economy in the world, the United States is
well positioned to inflict significant costs on the Chinese economy in
retaliation to any coercive tactics implemented by the Chinese. China's
best bargaining chip would be a massive sell-off of its U.S. holdings and
treasury investments, a move that would collapse the value of the U.S.
dollar overnight. 24 However, if China were to dump its U.S. holdings or
scale back its purchase of U.S. assets, the RMB would appreciate in
value relative to the dollar. This strategy would place significant costs
on China's own economy, as it is estimated that a ten percent
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Blyth, supra note 10, at 1.
Id. at 18.
Drezner, supranote 1, at 20.
See id. at 41.
Id. at 21 (calling this China's "nuclear option").
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appreciation of the RMB translates to a loss equivalent of three percent
of China's GDP in its foreign reserves. 25 Not to mention, Chinese
exports and manufacturing industries would take a hit as its goods
would become more expensive overnight. Moreover, any type of
economic statecraft would likely initiate a trade war with the United
States, which China will not risk. The country has had a trade surplus
with the United States in excess of 200 billion dollars a year for over a
decade, 26 a relationship it surely wants to continue.
Third, China's rise as a global power has exposed a breadth of policy
disagreements between China and the United States. These high
expectations of future conflicts greatly reduce the chance that the
United States will concede to any financial pressure exerted by China
for fear of weakening its bargaining power in the future. 27
Lastly, China will not be able to use financial leverage against the
United States because the United States does not employ a fixed
exchange rate regime. Rather, the U.S. issues debt denominated in its
own currency which constrains China from exerting influence as a
creditor state because China's U.S. debt securities promise future
payments in U.S. dollars. 28 Therefore, Chinese threats to sell off its U.S.
holdings are inherently less credible because any financial attack that
weakens the value of the U.S. dollar also erodes the future value on 1.13
trillion dollars of China's U.S. holdings. 29 If anything, the current
monetary regime limits Chinese action in respect to its foreign reserves,
as the country cannot maintain its trade surplus if it allows the RMB to
appreciate relative to the dollar. 30
Drezner argues that "[t]he importance of the American market to
Chinese exporters-and the threat of trade retaliation in the face of
Chinese financial statecraft-highlights the mutual dependency of the
two economies." 31 This mutual dependency indicates that the global
market can act as a regulator. Even though the two countries are rooted
in different political systems, it is in their mutual interests to maintain
the status quo as both benefit from the flow of goods and capital

25. Gregory Chin & Eric Helleiner, Calling China's Bluff. Why It's Far Too Early to
Fear China's Burgeoning Financial Clout, FOREIGN POLIcY (Jan. 23, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/01/23/calling-chinas-bluffl.
26. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, TRADE IN GOODS WITH CHINA (2017), https://www.

census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html.
27. Drezner, supra note 1, at 20-21.
28. Id. at 21.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 22.
31. Id. at 21 (highlighting how this interdependence between the two economies makes
it difficult for China to credibly threaten financial leverage against the United States).
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between the two countries. As an effect, the global market limits each of
these countries' ability to force policy changes on the other.
III. THE REAL IMPACT OF CHINA'S RISE AS A CREDITOR NATION

While China cannot control U.S. policy, the real risk of China
holding so much U.S. debt is that China's domestic policies have become
insulated from international scrutiny-just as U.S. policies are
insulated from the Chinese. In a study of the United States' use of
capital markets to force policy changes in China, Russia, and Sudan,
Benn Stiel and Robert Litan found the U.S. efforts to be fruitless as the
other countries were able to find alternative sources of credit at minimal
costs. 32

Yet, I believe the real risk of China holding so much U.S. debt is
that its rise as a creditor nation helped it regain its monetary
sovereignty and increase its influence over global markets. Enabled by a
lack of international regulation and enforcement, China has used its
currency policies of undervaluing the RMB-policies which violate
agreements with the IMF-to grow into the second largest economy in
the world. 33 These currency policies were predicated upon an increase in
foreign reserves, which ultimately led to the emergence of China as a
creditor state.
China's ability to violate IMF agreements (discussed below) is a
humble reminder that sometimes in the short-term, "[m]arkets are
neither self-governing nor [are] necessarily democratic." 34 Often, the
biggest problem with regulating on a global scale is enforcement.
However, even if effective international enforcement measures are
implemented, it may be too late to enforce Chinese currency violations
as the lack of IMF enforcement has allowed the country to grow into one
of the world's most powerful trading nations. As a result, most countries
will avoid confronting China on currency issues for fear of trade
repercussions.
But is there some sort of "global invisible hand" where, given
enough time, the global market will eventually act as a regulator to stop
or prevent countries like China from intervening in the global currency
markets? Analysis of this question necessitates an understanding that
markets and law are institutions, and, as such, they are made up of

32. BENN STEIL & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL STATECRAFT: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 73 (2006).

33. See Yu, supra note 6, at 581-82.
34. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH
LAw REFORM 3 (2004).
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social dynamic
processes. 35 Consequently,
markets
and legal
institutions are constantly being shaped by thousands of issues pulling
in different directions. I believe that in the long-term, China will rein in
its currency policies to achieve other economic objectives. The global
market will act as a long-term regulator, but a more effective
enforcement system will still be needed at the international level.
A History: IMF Created to Stop Currency Devaluations
In the years leading to the Great Depression, countries engaged in
the intentional undervaluation of their currencies to gain competitive
trade advantages relative to their neighbors. 36 Looking out for their own
economies, each country competitively undervalued its currency to try
and have the cheapest exports. 37 A race to the bottom ensued, and in
combination with other protectionist trade policies, the global economy
spiraled into a state of depression.38
Looking at the big picture, it is easy to see that the problem boiled
down to a divergence between domestic and international interests.
Each country had a stake in looking out for its own economy, but when
countries enacted competitive currency devaluations at the same time,
the world's economies crashed. Thus, after the Great Depression and
World War II, the international monetary system "moved from an
informally regulated laissez-faire model to a genuinely international
system whereby nations surrendered a degree of economic sovereignty
39
and accepted a measure of oversight by international institutions."
Implicit in this move away from a traditionally laissez-faire model
are two possibilities. First, perhaps the world powers realized that in
certain circumstances, such as the interwar period between the First
and Second World Wars, no "global invisible hand" would correct the
international market from the competitive currency devaluation and
other protectionist trade policies. However, another possibility exists.
Maybe a market correction did take place; it was just in the form of a
global depression. In this case, the move away from the laissez-faire
system indicates that the world governments were unwilling to accept

35. Id. at 10 ("Markets and law are institutions and, as for all institutions, this means
they are dynamic social processes, not monolithic entities.").
36. Jeffrey S. Beckington & Matthew R. Amon, Competitive Currency Depreciation:The
Need for a More Effective International Legal Regime, 10 J. INT'L BUS. & L., 209, 213
(2011) (claiming competitive currency devaluation was an attempt for governments to "fill
a legal vacuum in the absence of international consensus and coordination").
37. Id.
38. See id. at 209.
39. Id. at 211.
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that market's solution because real people fell into human suffering as
they lost their jobs during the Great Depression.
Either way, the IMF was created at the UN Conference at Bretton
Woods in July 1944 "to build a framework for international economic
cooperation in order to avoid repeating the competitive devaluations
that contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s."4 According to
the IMF, "the IMF's primary mission is to ensure the stability of the
international monetary system-the system of exchange rates and
international payments that enables countries and their citizens to
transact with each other." 41
The establishment of the IMF was an unprecedented ceding of
monetary authority, 42 but one almost natural for Americans who
predicate state authority on a vertical hierarchy of power. 43 Each
member state ceded a level of its sovereignty by giving up its untainted
right to interfere in its own currency markets. Until that point, a
country's currency policy was considered to be a wholly domestic right,
completely insulated from international regulation.4 But not far
removed from the Great Depression, countries were willing to cede some
sovereign authority in exchange for international stability.4 5
The promise of the IMF was the possibility of a stable international
monetary system. 46 From 1946 to 1971, the IMF regulated a fixed parity
exchange rate system, in which the value of each nation's currency was
defined in terms of the U.S. dollar, and the U.S. dollar was defined by
gold reserves. 47 Countries could manipulate their currencies up to ten
percent away from the levels set by the IMF, and any manipulation past
ten percent required approval by the IMF Member States."
B. InterlegalitiesBetween Domestic and InternationalLaw
Ironically, this fixed parity system fell apart in 1971, when the
United States devalued the dollar twice without the IMF's consent,
40. About the lMF, INT'L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/en/About (last visited
Oct. 13, 2017) (click "IMiF at a Glance").
41. Id.
42. Beckington & Amon, supra note 36, at 209.
43. AMAN, JR., supra note 34, at 3 ("[T]he federal government over or above the states;
the states over or above local communities; and, looking outward from the United States,
transnational organizations over national organizations.").
44. Beckington & Amon, supra note 36, at 213.
45. See id. at 241.
46. Id.
47. JONATHAN

E.

SANFORD,

CONG.

MANIPULATION: THE IMF AND WTO 1 (2011).
48. Id.

RESEARCH

SERV.,

RS

22658,

CURRENCY
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sending the currency markets into turmoil. 49 The current IMF system
was adopted in 1978, which resulted in the IMF implementing a
regulatory structure in between a traditional laissez-faire structure and
a fixed-rate system pegged to the U.S. dollar.50 Countries were allowed
to use a fixed or floating exchange rate system, so long as they agreed to
follow the IMF guidelines and did not use gold as the basis for their
currency's value.51
However, I believe the amendment in 1978 exacerbated the tension
between a country's interest in controlling its own currency valuations
and the international interest of stability. The IMF amendment created
what Mariana Valverde refers to as "interlegalities." 52 Interlegalities
exist at the intersection of different legal systems designed to regulate
different regulatory scales. 53 For currency manipulation, interlegalities
occur at the intersection of national and international interests, since a
country's domestic fiscal policies may diverge from the rules governed
by the IMF.
At the domestic level, monetary sovereignty, or the ability to adapt
to currency valuations, is critical for any country's economy.M This
notion is especially true for developing countries with export-driven
economies.5 5 By exercising monetary sovereignty to undervalue a
currency, a state can protect its domestic industries from foreign
competition, attract foreign direct investment, and influence the market
price for exporting goods and services.56 Unquestionably, these shortterm benefits led China to pursue its currency devaluations policies in
the interest of its own economy.
In 2010, economists William Cline and John Williamson, with the
Peterson Institute for International Economics, estimated that the
Chinese RMB was undervalued relative to the U.S. dollar by about
twenty percent. 57 Effectively, this made Chinese exports twenty percent
cheaper than American exports, which helped to expand China's
economy and the number of available jobs in the short-term. This study
suggests that China had a substantial trade advantage over other
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Mariana Valverde, Jurisdictionand Scale.- Legal Technicalities'as Resources for
Theory, 18 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 139, 141 (2009).
53. Id.
54. See Esmel, supra note 3, at 404-)5.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Beckington & Amon, supra note 36, at 255 (citing a study by William R. Cline
and John Williamson of the Peterson Institute for International Economics which
compares levels of effective exchange rates with fundamental equilibrium exchange rates).
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exporting nations, and thus, inherently undermined its core agreement
with the IMF to not intentionally devalue its currency to sustain unfair
trade advantages.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH THE IMF: A LACK OF ENFORCEMENT

To understand why the IMF lacks the ability to efficiently enforce
China's currency manipulations, one must first look to the language in
the IMF's General Obligations of its member states. Article IV(1)(iii) of
the IMF Articles of Agreement states, "member countries shall avoid
manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in
order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an
unfair competitive advantage over other members."58
The first problem is that the language of the member obligations
makes it virtually impossible to prove a violation under the IMF
Articles of Agreement.5 9 To establish that China has violated Article IV
of the IMF Articles of Agreement, two elements must be shown. First, a
complaining country must show that the People's Bank of China has
taken deliberative action to manipulate its exchange rate, which China
has a right to do to a certain extent. 60 In reality, this is easy to prove
because manipulation can occur by a central bank buying or selling
foreign currencies to influence the value of their own currency. 61 Under
this prong, policies such as quantitative easing are sufficient to prove
the first element, and consequently the majority of large countries
around the world are considered to be "currency manipulators." 62
Although a negative political connotation surrounds "currency
manipulation," manipulation alone is not enough to warrant a violation
under the IMF.
Second, the language of Article IV provides that a violation occurs if
the manipulator engaged in the currency manipulation with the intent
to gain an unfair competitive advantage over another country. 63 This
provision tries to limit interlegalities between national and
58. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. IV(1)(iii), July 22,
1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (amended by Second Amendment of Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 29 U.S.T. 2003 (1967-1977)) [Hereinafter
"IMF"] (emphasis added).
59. See Esmel, supra note 3, at 420; SANFORD, supra note 47, at 2.
60. See SANFORD, supra note 47, at 1-2 (until 1971, countries had the right to
manipulate currency values within 10 percent of IMF rate, and current rules allow for
currency manipulation as long as the manipulation was not done to gain an unfair
advantage).
61. See Esmel, supra note 3, at 420.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 420-21.

506

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

25:1

international scales by creating a framework where countries cannot
promote their own economies to the detriment of international stability.
As evidenced by history, countries taking manipulative measures to
advantage their own economies could lead to competitive devaluations
that shrink the global economy-the exact problem the IMF was
founded to prevent.
Nevertheless, countries suspected of manipulating currency
markets with the intent of gaining unfair trade advantages easily evade
violations under Article IV by justifying the manipulation on valid
domestic policy grounds. 64 In preparing a report for Congress, Jonathan
E. Sanford, a specialist in international trade and finance, cited how
countries commonly justify currency manipulations with the valid
objective of "stabiliz[ing] the value of their currency in order to prevent
disruption to their domestic economic system."6 5 Regardless,

some

evidence indicates that the IMF avoids confrontation when powerful
countries are involved in potential currency manipulation.6 6
Yet even if a country could establish that China has violated Article
IV, the IMF does not possess an effective enforcement process to correct
the violation.67 Under Article IV, the IMF is required to engage in
surveillance over exchange rate policies, but it cannot force a country to
change its exchange rate.6 8 The breadth of the IMF's enforcement
capabilities is to offer advice to potential violators and to provide a
forum for countries to urge currency manipulators to change their
exchange rate procedures.69 However, the ultimate authority to change
an exchange rate resides with the country suspected of violating Article
IV.70
China's rise as a creditor nation, and its emergence as the world's
second largest economy, has given the country the power to keep
international organizations and democratic nations from influencing its
domestic monetary policies. For example, in 2008, the year that China
became the largest foreign holder of U.S. debt, China successfully
vetoed the IMF's attempt to investigate whether the RMB was
fundamentally misaligned.71 Moreover, I believe the more trading power
China possesses, the less willing Member States will be to bring
challenges against China's currency policies. The inability of the IMF to
64. See Esmel, supra note 3, at 420; see also SANFORD, supra note 47, at 2.
65. SANFORD, supra note 47, at 2.
66. See Robert W. Staiger & Alan 0. Sykes, 'CurrencyManipulation'andWorld Trade,
9 WORLD TRADE REv. 583, 584-85 (2010).
67. See SANFORD, supra note 47, at 2.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See Beckington & Amon, supra note 36, at 254.
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effectively deal with China's policies has led many scholars to look to
other areas of international law to stop currency manipulation through
effective enforcement mechanisms.
V. THE WTO AS A SOLUTION TO INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT

Many argue that the World Trade Organization (WTO) should
handle violations under the IMF. In international law, the WTO is
somewhat of a unique international body because it possesses a
mechanism for enforcing its rules through its Dispute Settlement
Board. 72 Through this enforcement mechanism, a country may request
that a dispute settlement panel hear its complaint if it believes another
country violated WTO rules to its detriment.7 3 Under this system, the
accused country cannot veto the appointment of the panel or the
adoption of a WTO decision, like it can under the IMF.74

If a violation is proven, and the losing party refuses to comply with
the WTO ruling within a reasonable amount of time, the WTO will
authorize the complaining country to implement retaliatory measures
against the offending country.7 5 This dispute resolution system has
attracted large support as a means to handle currency violations, but
whether currency disputes should fall under the WTO's jurisdiction is a
debated topic.
A. JurisdictionalHurdles Concerningthe WTO
Many economists agree that currency devaluations should be
covered as an export subsidy under the General Agreement against
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a predecessor agreement to the WTO.76 This

is a very plausible argument as an undervalued currency has the same
practical effect as an export subsidy for a country's domestic export
producers. Yet, the main jurisdictional hurdle is that currency
devaluations do not fit the WTO's strict definition of what constitutes an
export subsidy.77

Others argue that the amendment to the 1996 version of Article
XV:2 of the GATT provides sufficient jurisdictional ties for the WTO to

72. See SANFORD, supra note 47, at 2; see also Esmel, supra note 3, at 423 ('The WTO
is known for having the most effective enforcement system in international law.").
73. See SANFORD, supra note 47, at 2.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2-3.
76. See id. at 3; see also Esmel, supra note 3, at 426-27.
77. SANFORD, supranote 47, at 3.
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enforce currency violations under the IMF. 78 In 1996, the two
international organizations agreed to "consult with each other in the
discharge of their respective mandates" to achieve greater coherency in
global economic policies. 7 9 This provision allows the WTO to work in
conjunction with the IMF, and to default to the IMF's expertise on
issues involving the international monetary system. 8 0 However, while
the WTO and IMF agreed to communicate with each other on matters of
"mutual interest," the WTO dispute settlement panels are specifically
excluded from the agreement. 8' Although this cooperation between the
IMF and WTO is encouraging, it has not been sufficient to overcome the
jurisdictional hurdle for currency violations to be brought under the
WTO. 82

The final argument is to change the actual language of the IMF and
WTO articles to grant the WTO jurisdiction over currency violations. 83
However, to change the IMF articles, eighty-five percent of the IMF
Member States have to approve the change for the amendment to be
effective. 84 It is unlikely that any nation that moves for an amendment
will be successful because the majority of the member countries seem to
be content with the present system.8 5 Additionally, countries likely do
not want to give up more monetary sovereignty amid fears of giving the
IMF too much power over their domestic economies.8* Changing the
WTO agreements is even less realistic, as the organization requires
unanimous consent of all its members for a change to be ratified.87
VI. THE GLOBAL INVISIBLE HAND

Effective enforcement efforts through the WTO need to be
implemented to stop countries from devaluing their currencies and
destabilizing international markets. However, in the case of China, even
if jurisdiction could be granted for the WTO to handle currency
disputes, there would be little to no impact on Chinese currency policies
because of the country's standing as an international trading power.
Hypothetically, if the United States brought a complaint against
China under the WTO Dispute Settlement Board for a violation of IMF
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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Article IV, winning would only authorize the United States to take
retaliatory measures against China in the form of trade tariffs and
quotas. In response, China would retaliate and implement an economic
sanction of its own, regardless of whether the WTO authorized it. Such
actions would inevitably start a trade war.
Illustrating this point, in 2011, the U.S. Senate passed the Currency
Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act to impose countervailing duties on
Chinese goods if it found China had been undervaluing its currency.88
The Act failed to gain support in the House of Representatives, and the
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Ma Zhaoxu, used the opportunity
to indicate that there would be repercussions that would "severely upset
China-U.S. economic and trade relations."89 As mentioned above, the
interdependencies of the two economies make U.S. intervention in
Chinese currency policies unlikely for fear of economic retaliation.90
In a sense, the IMF has missed its best chance to regulate China's
currency policies. As China became a creditor nation, investing its
foreign reserves in the sovereign debt of other nations, its economy
gained a distinct advantage over other exporting nations that were
complying with the IMF rules. China utilized the benefits of an
artificially low currency to grow into the second largest economy in the
world. Even if countries could establish a violation under the IMF, and
assuming they could find an effective means of enforcing the violation,
many would elect not to for fear of alienating one of the largest trading
partners in the world.
Instead of confronting China through the IMF forum, other
exporting nations that are truly disadvantaged by China's currency
policies will likely revert to devaluing their own currencies to keep their
export-driven economies competitive. Therefore, China's rise as a
creditor nation inherently brings instability to the global monetary
system as long as the country continues to neglect its obligations under
the IMF.91
Yet, I believe there is still hope that the global market can act as a
regulator in the long-term. The possibility for a Global Invisible Hand is
rooted in the notion that markets are dynamic social institutions. 92
Thus, at a certain point, China's intentional undervaluation of its

88. See Yu, supra note 6, at 597-98 ("Despite passing the Senate, the [Currency
Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011] received no attention from the House of
Representatives and eventually died.").
89. Id.
90. Drezner, supra note 1, at 20.
91. See Beckington & Amon, supra note 36, at 267-68.
92. AMAN, JR., supra note 34, at 10.
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currency against IMF agreements will eventually affect is ability to
achieve other economic policy objectives.
Even though China has grown to the second largest economy in the
world, it is still considered a developing economy. 93 According to Joseph
Stiglitz, a recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics, China is gradually
shifting from an export-driven growth economy to a domestic services
and household consumption economy. 94 Recently, China has even
convinced the IMF to put the RMB on its list of world reserve currencies
alongside the U.S. dollar, Pound Sterling, Japanese Yen, Euro, Swiss
franc, and Canadian dollar.9 5
In response to the IMF recognizing the RMB as a reserve currency,
China has made strides in liberalizing its economy and in allowing its
currency to fundamentally realign with market forces.96 Some take the
inclusion of the RMB as a signal that China will play a more active role
in global economic and finance issues.97 However, the move by the IMF
has also been met with stark criticism from the United States. Senator
Bob Casey remarked that the IMF's decision did nothing but "validate
China's history of cheating," while Senator Charles Schumer stated that
the "IMF is choosing to reward China's currency manipulation instead
of combating it."98

Nevertheless, it seems that China's future financial strategy
includes increasing the use of the RMB as a reserve currency around the
world. However, if China wants to keep the benefits associated with
being a world reserve currency, it will have to shift its policies to adhere
to its IMF obligations. Otherwise, the IMF could remove the RMB from
its list of currencies, signaling to the world market that the RMB is
inherently unstable. Thus, for China to solidify its new economic
position, it will have to rein in its currency depreciation policies.

93. The World Bank in China, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.orglen/
country/chinaloverview (last updated Mar. 28, 2017).
94. Joseph E. Stiglitz, China's Bumpy New Normal, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 27, 2016),
https://www.project-syndicate.orgcommentary/china-economic-policy-debate-by-joseph-e-stiglitz-2016-01?barrier-true.
95. Ian Talley, China Joins World's Elite Currency Club: IMF's Decision to Make Yuan
a Reserve Currency is Expected to Motivate FurtherReforms, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2015,
7:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/imf-lifts-chinese-yuan-to-elite-lending-reserve-curre
ncy-status-1448903067.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is a myth that China's possession of 1.13 trillion
dollars in U.S. debt will give the country the ability to influence United
States policy at home and around the world. However, China's rise as a
creditor nation has helped it regain its monetary sovereignty and has
allowed the country to exert influence over global currency markets. The
IMF's inability to prove and enforce violations under Article IV of its
member obligations allowed China to undervalue its currency with no
ramifications. As a result, China utilized its distinct trade advantage
over other export-driven economies to grow into the second largest
economy in the world. China's currency policies have produced global
systemic risk as they create the incentive and the need for other
exporting countries to depreciate their own currencies to stay
competitive.
While jurisdictional hurdles exist, there is a real need to find an
alternative means of enforcing potential currency violations under IMF
Article IV. There are plausible arguments for the WTO Dispute
Resolution Board to take jurisdiction over enforcement, but any solution
will have little effect on China as member nations will be reluctant to
confront the trading power for fear of economic retaliation.
In the end, the global market will act as a regulator to ensure that
China does not fundamentally undervalue its currency. The "Global
Invisible Hand" will correct China's currency policies because the global
market and legal institutions that regulate it are the products of
dynamic social processes. Eventually, China will transition away from
an export-driven economy to establish itself as a lasting world power. By
taking measures to liberalize its economy, China has been able to get
the IMF to list its currency, the RMB, as a world reserve currency. This
symbolizes China's emergence as a global economic power, but also
implicitly assumes that China will not fundamentally undervalue its
currency in the future.
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